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On December 17, 2009, The Los Angeles Times revealed why some many train accidents have taken place on California. Metrolink and other commuter rail services throughout California sought and received permission to bypass a federal requirement to install simple safety signs intended to help avoid accidents like last year’s Chatsworth disaster. Metrolink was granted the waiver more than ten years ago.

The action was disclosed in a technical and financial analysis of high-tech train collision avoidance systems prepared by the staff of the state Public Utilities Commission, which shares some oversight responsibilities for commuter rail systems. The report concluded that the 25 deaths and 135 injuries caused by the Metrolink catastrophe show the signs should be installed, an action that could be ordered by the commission next year. The placards, which some railroads in other states are using, were to be placed on certain signals and at each end of stations such as Chatsworth.

Known in railroad parlance as “delay in block” warnings, they are designed to remind locomotive engineers of speed restrictions required after they stop at passenger depots located within a series, or “block,” of signals.

Generally, those restrictions require trains leaving the station to stay under 40 mph and be prepared to stop until engineers see a signal indicating it is clear to go faster.

The federal requirements were prompted by deadly, back-to-back 1996 passenger rail accidents in New Jersey and Maryland that were similar to the Chatsworth crash. In both cases, engineers failed to stop at junction signals.

Metrolink and many other railroads argued at the time that they should be granted a waiver of the rule because the signs could be confusing. Federal rail regulators agreed, allowing most commuter train systems to forgo installing the signs.

In a statement, a Metrolink spokesperson said the agency “has always been and will continue to be” in compliance with federal rail safety orders, including signage requirements. Federal regulators at that time deemed the agency’s approach to signage to be safe, the agency said.

“Metrolink is constantly evaluating the railroad signal system with our federal and state partners with safety our highest priority,” the statement said.

The signs may not have prevented the Chatsworth crash, PUC regulators acknowledged in their report. But the safety value of such signs clearly outweighs any potential for confusion, they said.

The commission report also notes that the signs were specifically intended to address one of the safety violations that evidently occurred in Chatsworth, when a Metrolink engineer sped away from the station, reaching 54 mph as he approached an apparent red light.

Engineer Robert Sanchez, who died in the crash, also was text messaging on a cellphone in violation of rules. He ran the stop signal just before plowing into a Union Pacific freight train, according to preliminary findings by the National Transportation Safety Board.

(Some witnesses have said the final signal was green as Metrolink 111 approached, although federal investigators say they have found no evidence supporting those claims.)

In its report, the PUC said Metrolink obtained approval to forgo the signs after assuring federal officials the commuter rail service required adherence to the speed and operating restrictions “by all trains, in all [signal] blocks, at all times.”

But Metrolink’s subsequent efforts to make sure engineers actually followed the restrictions appear to have been “less than satisfactory,” the report states.

The PUC analysis concludes that a computerized safety system, known as positive train control, is the most effective means of avoiding passenger rail accidents. Investments in other interim crash prevention technologies should not be required by the commission and priority should be given to deploying positive train control rapidly, the report recommends.

In the meantime, other passenger rail services should consider following Metrolink’s lead by installing video cameras on trains to monitor engineers’ activities, the report states.

Metrolink recently announced it is investigating a new safety breach on the regional commuter line involving an engineer who allegedly failed to stop at a red signal during the week of November 23, 2009 as another train approached. The incident, which also is being reviewed by federal regulators, is the fourth alleged red-light violation since the Sept. 12, 2008, crash in Chatsworth that killed 25. Investigators have attributed that crash to an engineer running a red light.

The most recent incident occurred on the San Bernardino line east of Union Station near downtown Los Angeles. The engineer recognized the problem, declared an emergency and stopped his train before it passed through a switch that would have put it in the path of an oncoming commuter train, officials said. Some Metrolink board members are voicing exasperation that another potentially serious violation of a basic safety rule appears to have occurred, despite intensive reform efforts since the Chatsworth crash.

“This is simply inexcusable,” said board Chairman Keith Millhouse, a Moorpark council member and Metrolink rider. “I’m just extremely upset. These engineers are going to get weeded out if they are not going to do their job.”

“There is no acceptable number of red-light violations,” board member Richard Katz said.

Some board members say that red-light violations may be impossible to completely eliminate as long as people maintain all control of the trains. But they too are calling for a deeper examination of the problem and strong discipline of engineers who run red lights.

“There’s got to be a root cause to this,” said board member Art Brown, an Orange County representative. “There’s just too many. We’ve got to dig down and find out exactly what’s going on.”

Brown and others said the latest incident underscores a need for a high-tech collision-avoidance system in Southern California, where freight and commuter trains share hundreds of miles of track.

The cause of last week’s safety lapse, which delayed trains on the San Bernardino line for more than two hours, is still being sorted out. But there were no initial indications of a mechanical problem, board members said. The unidentified engineer has been removed from service pending completion of the probe.

The train that passed the red light was outbound from Union Station carrying passengers. It was not immediately clear if the inbound train had riders.

Metrolink staff declined to provide details of the incident, citing the investigation. But U.S. regulators also are looking into the incident, said Federal Railroad Administration spokesman Warren Flatau.

The current probe will be one of the first to incorporate footage from just-installed video cameras that are trained on engineers.

Officials have been seeking to eliminate the potentially tragic safety violations with the new video cameras, extra engineers assigned as lookouts on key trains and stepped-up random field testing. (The train that passed the red light did not have an extra engineer in the cab, officials said.)

The engineers’ union is suing Metrolink to shut down the surveillance cameras, contending that they violate members’ privacy rights.

A union spokesman said he was not familiar with the details of last week’s incident. But he said the cameras may or may not be of great use in this case.

The incident might have involved “just a judgment error” on required stopping distance — something that can be addressed with additional training, said Tim Smith, a representative of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen.

Still, the incident appears to have stiffened the resolve of board members to keep the cameras.

“It’s going to be fantastic,” Brown said, “to be able to see exactly what he was doing.”

Millhouse added: “I think the union needs to be less concerned about cameras and more concerned about every single person being focused on their job — and doing their job.”

He said that Connex Railroad, which provides Metrolink train crews under contract, has frontline responsibility for supervising engineers. “They need to be vigorously out there ensuring this doesn’t happen,” Millhouse said.

A Connex spokeswoman said red-light violations are taken very seriously. “We are continually looking at them, from a 360-degree view, to eradicate them,” Erica Swerdlow said.

In the Chatsworth case, federal investigators’ preliminary findings indicate that a Metrolink engineer who had been text messaging ran a red light just before plowing into a Union Pacific freight train. A final report on the causes of the crash is still pending.

News of the latest problem, coupled with a pending proposal to increase Metrolink fares and/or reduce service, have added to rider worries.

“I’m concerned,” said Rita Yussoupova, who rides the system from Orange County to the San Fernando Valley and was on board last month when a train hit a pickup truck.

“They shouldn’t be passing red lights,” she said. “They should notice them. That’s what they are paid to do.”

On September 22, 2009, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommended transit lines and railroads that use the same signal system that failed to detect a stopped train in the area of a deadly Washington crash should check them to make sure they are working properly.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) said it was not ready to say what caused the June 22 crash that killed nine and injured seventy when a train hit another one stopped on the tracks. However, it issued nine safety recommendations, including six deemed urgent, to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority and others.

On the Metro line, each track circuit uses two modules to communicate. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) said tests after the crash showed the modules communicated without checking with the rails, causing the circuit to lose its ability to detect the stopped train.

“Our findings so far indicate a pressing need to issue these recommendations to immediately address safety glitches we have found that could lead to another tragic accident on WMATA or another transit or rail system,” NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman said in a statement.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) had said previously that equipment that is supposed to detect stopped trains failed periodically in the days leading up to the crash. Metro also said the system failed to detect trains during tests after the crash.

The board recommended that Metro and Alstom Signaling, which made the track circuit modules, work together to eliminate the problems that could affect the safe performance of the system. It also said Metro should develop a regular testing program.

It asked federal departments advise all rail transit operators and railroads that use audio frequency track circuits about the findings from the accident investigation.

“The NTSB has identified a symptom of the problem with the track circuit, but not a root cause or a solution,” said Metro General Manager John Catoe. He said Metro will implement the recommendations and that “we are doing everything we can to make our rail system as safe as possible.”

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has requested responses from each of the rail agencies within thirty days on the urgent recommendations, with steps they have taken or plan to take.