Attorney Daily - Your source for the most important legal news

On October 22, 2009, a Rhode Island Hospital surgeon operated on the wrong finger of a patient during outpatient hand surgery. A hospital statement on October 23, 2009 acknowledged that it was the fifth wrong-site surgery at Rhode Island Hospital, and the sixth in the state, since 2007.

The patient was scheduled for surgery on two fingers. A joint on one finger underwent a procedure intended for another finger, hospital president Timothy J. Babineau said in a letter to employees. “The surgeon discussed the error with the patient and, in keeping with our policy, the Department of Health was immediately notified.” The hospital said it would not disclose further details about the surgery to protect the patient’s confidentiality.

State law requires hospitals to notify the Health Department of major incidents within 24 hours.

“Overall, we’re frustrated and we’re seriously concerned that this seems to be a continuing pattern at Rhode Island Hospital,” Beardsworth said. The results of the Health Department investigation will not be available immediately.

Babineau’s statement said that the hospital is conducting “a thorough analysis” of what went wrong. “Thus far, we have identified an ambiguity in the time-out process for hand surgery when more than one procedure is being performed which may have contributed to the error,” he wrote.

A “time-out” is a pause before surgery when the operating room staff follows a set of procedures to verify they are performing the right surgery on the right part of the right patient.

Shortcomings in this process have figured in other wrong-site surgery errors at the hospital.

Babineau said the hospital has put “a tremendous amount of work” into error prevention after the string of embarrassing wrong-site surgeries. That included participating in a national pilot program to prevent surgical errors.

Additionally, in June, the Hospital Association of Rhode Island announced that all hospitals and surgical centers had agreed to follow the same process to prevent surgical errors, making Rhode Island the first state in which a uniform protocol was voluntarily adopted by all surgical providers.

On October 30, 2009, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) enforced a record $87 million fine against oil giant BP PLC for failing to fix safety hazards after a 2005 explosion killed 15 workers at its Texas City refinery.

The fine, which is the largest in OSHA’s history comes after a 6-month inspection revealed hundreds of violations of a 2005 settlement agreement to repair hazards at the refinery. OSHA said the company also committed hundreds of new violations at the nation’s third largest refinery by failing to follow industry controls on pressure relief safety systems and other precautions.

Labor Secretary Hilda Solis said BP failed to live up to the terms of its commitment to protect employees. If the problems are not addressed, Solis said it “could lead to another catastrophe.”

“An $87 million fine won’t restore those lives, but we can’t let this happen again,” Solis said. “Workplace safety is more than a slogan. It’s the law.”

The deadly explosion at BP’s Texas City refinery, about 40 miles southeast of Houston, also injured more than 170 people.

In a statement, the company said most of the alleged violations relate to an ongoing disagreement between OSHA and BP that is already pending before the Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission, a body that is independent of OSHA.

In this case, OSHA officials found 270 violations totaling $56.7 million in penalties for BP’s failure to take corrective action as required by terms of the 2005 settlement agreement with OSHA. Agency inspectors also identified 439 new willful violations totaling $30.7 million in penalties for failure to repair pressure release safety devices.

OSHA officials said the 2005 explosion was caused by defective pressure relief systems. The explosion occurred after a piece of equipment called a blowdown drum overfilled with highly flammable liquid hydrocarbons. Alarms and gauges that were supposed to warn of the overfilled equipment did not work properly.

Since the 2005 accident, four additional people have died at the Texas refinery, including one employee and three contractors.

On October 23, 2009, U.S. safety regulators upgraded their investigation of complaints of potential brake problems in Honda Motor Co’s 2007-08 Odyssey minivans that might have played a part to 10 crashes, with seven injuries. To date, no fatalities have been reported.

Up to 343,000 Odysseys, one of the most popular minivans in the United States, are covered by the review, according to details of a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration investigative report that was dated October 19, 2009.

The safety agency and the manufacturer have received an estimated 600 complaints alleging “soft” or “spongy” pedal action on the anti-lock brakes. Vans in some cases took longer to stop and some rolled through stop signs or traffic lights, the government said.

The NHTSA’s preliminary analysis was launched in May and included 2006-08 vans. But investigators determined the matter overwhelmingly concerned the later models.

Safety documents show that investigators have upgraded their probe to an engineering analysis, which can precede a recall. The government gave no indication a recall would be the next step, however.

Investigators are looking at whether air is entering the braking system, causing the problem. Honda has said air may indeed accumulate after the engine is started but that the condition would not worsen braking performance even if the height and feel of the pedal is different at times.